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 Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets∗
Marc Bourreau†and Pınar Do˘ gan‡
February, 2010
Abstract
In this paper, we consider an unregulated incumbent who owns a broadband infrastructure
and decides on how much access to provide to a potential entrant. The level of access, i.e., the
network elements that are shared in the provision of competing broadband services, not only
determines the amount of investment the entrant needs to undertake to enter the market, but
also the intensity of post-entry competition. We consider an access scheme that determines an
access level and an associated two-part tariﬀ. We show that the equilibrium level of access is
higher when the sensitivity of product diﬀerentiation to the level of access is lower, and when
the marginal investment cost is higher. We also show that the unregulated incumbent sets a
suboptimally low (high) level of access if the degree of service diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high
(low).
Keywords: Infrastructure Sharing; Access; Telecommunications.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Regulation of access is crucial for fostering competition in the broadband market; the incumbent
ﬁrms are the monopolist providers of an essential input—access to network elements, including the
∗Financial support from France Telecom is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank Katie Naeve for her editorial
assistance.
†Institut Telecom, Telecom ParisTech, Paris, France, and CREST-LEI. E-mail: marc.bourreau@telecom-
paristech.fr.
‡Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University. E-mail: pinar_dogan@hks.harvard.edu.
1local loop—and are by and large vertically integrated to the downstream market. Regulating one-
way access involves determining (i) the mandatory access level (i.e., the network elements that are
subject to mandatory access), and (ii) the access price scheme.
The latter task—determining the optimal access price for a given level of access—has received a
great deal of attention both in the theoretical literature and in the policy arena.1 More recently,
a number of studies have focused on the eﬀect of access prices on the incumbent ﬁrms’ incentives
to invest,2 while a number of others have focused on its potential eﬀect on build-or-buy decisions
of the entrant ﬁrms.3 A series of complementing studies look at the empirical relationship between
access obligations (or access prices) and investment in the broadband market.4
In contrast with the regulation of access prices, the theoretical literature provides little guidance
to regulation of the access level, despite its highlighted importance in the "ladder of investment"
approach introduced by Cave (2006), which has been embraced by many national regulatory au-
thorities. According to this approach, regulation of the access level (as well as access prices) can
play a fundamental role in shaping competition in the longer-term: setting the access level "right"
can promote facility-based competition, which is often viewed as the ultimate aim in the broadband
sector.5 Note that, however, regulation of the access level is critical even in the absence of any
dynamic eﬃciency concerns due to its shorter-term impact on competition, i.e., static eﬃciency.
In this paper, we focus on the impact of the level of access on competition in the broadband
market. More speciﬁcally, we compare an unregulated incumbent’s incentives for infrastructure
sharing with the social optimum in the absence of any dynamic eﬃciency concerns.
We consider an unregulated incumbent who sets the level of access to its broadband infrastruc-
ture for a potential entrant, who initially does not own any network infrastructure. The incumbent
can provide access to its network at several diﬀerent levels. At the one extreme, the incumbent can
refuse provide access to its infrastructure, which leaves full network duplication as the only means
of entry into the market. At the other extreme, the entrant can rely solely on the incumbent’s
infrastructure to provide its services. For example, a pure resale arrangement requires full access
1See Vogelsang (2003), Armstrong (2002), and Laﬀont and Tirole (2000) for comprehensive reviews on access
pricing policies in the telecommunications industry.
2See, for example, Jorde et al. (2000) and Vareda (2007).
3See, for example, Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2005) and (2006), Sappington (2006), Gayle and Weisman (2007), and
Avenali et al (2010).
4See, for example, Crandall et al. (2004), Waverman et al. (2007), Friederiszick et al (2008), and Wallsten and
Hausladen (2009). Also, see Cambini and Jiang (2009) for a review of both theoretical and empirical literature on
access regulation and investment in broadband markets.
5See Bourreau et al (2009) for a critical review of the ladder of investment approach.
2to the incumbent’s infrastructure. In between these two extreme cases, access to network elements
is possible at several diﬀerent levels and we consider a continuum of them.6 A lower level of access
to the infrastructure refers to fewer network elements that are shared between the incumbent and
the entrant. In the ladder of investment jargon, this is a higher "rung" on the investment ladder,
as it requires a heavy investment for the entrant.
S e v e r a le c o n o m i cf a c t o r sa r el i k e l yt oi m p a c ta nunregulated incumbent’s decision on the level
of access it provides to the entrant ﬁrms.7 Those we explicitly consider in this paper are: the
economic feasibility of bypass; the cost of investing in diﬀerent network elements; the eﬃciency of
the entrant ﬁrm in providing broadband services; the intensity of potential competition (and how
it varies at diﬀerent levels of access).
We assume that diﬀerent levels of access not only require the entrant to undertake diﬀerent levels
of investment, but also may lead to diﬀerent intensities in post-entry competition. More speciﬁcally,
we assume that a higher (lower) level of access—that is, more (less) infrastructure sharing—leads to
a lower (higher) degree of diﬀerentiation in broadband services.
We show that the equilibrium level of access is higher when the sensitivity of product diﬀeren-
tiation to the level of access is lower, and when the marginal investment cost is higher. We also
show that the unregulated incumbent sets a suboptimally low (high) level of access if the degree of
service diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high (low).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out our benchmark model in an unregu-
lated environment where the full by-pass of the incumbent’s infrastructure is economically viable.
In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium access scheme, and we compare it with the social op-
timum in Section 4. In Section 5, we extend our basic model in various directions and discuss the
validity of our results (i) in the absence of a full-bypass option, (ii) with asymmetric ﬁrms (in terms
of eﬃciency in providing broadband services), (iii) with diﬀerent modes of competition (Cournot
versus Bertrand competition), and (iv) with multiple entrants in a regulated environment. Then,
we conclude.
6See, for example, Cave (2006) who ranks the network elements for broadband access with the order of relative
replicability—the copper loop, DSLAMs, backhaul, core IP network, access to the web, and resale.
7There may also be some technological or technical constraints, which we do not consider in this paper.
32 The Benchmark Model
We consider an unregulated incumbent (Firm 1) and a potential entrant (Firm 2). The incumbent’s
broadband infrastructure is composed of a continuum of network elements.
The incumbent decides to provide access to  ∈ [01] network elements of its infrastructure to
the potential entrant. We will refer to  as the level of access.I f  =0 , the incumbent denies
access to its infrastructure and the entrant’s sole possibility to enter in the market is by building
its own infrastructure.
If  =1 , the incumbent provides full access (i.e., resale of broadband services). Any inter-
mediary level of  ∈ (01) refers to an access arrangement with which the incumbent provides
access to some—but not all—network elements.8 If the entrant obtains access at a level  of the
incumbent’s infrastructure, it builds the remaining (1 − ) network elements that are necessary to
provide broadband services.
We assume that the marginal cost of providing access at any level is constant, and we normalize
it to zero.
Consumers Following Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), we consider a representative
consumer with a utility function
 (1 2)=1 + 2 −
1
2
h
(1)
2 +( 2)
2 +2( 1− )12
i

where 1 and 2 denote the quantity of the incumbent and the entrant, respectively, and  denotes
the degree of service diﬀerentiation, with  ∈ [],  ∈ [0) and  ≤ 1. The inverse demand is
then
 =  −  − (1 − )
where  denotes the price of ﬁrm  with  =1 2 and  6= .
Service diﬀerentiation The degree of service diﬀerentiation depends on the level of access, i.e.,
 = ().W ea s s u m et h a t(1) =  and (0) = ,a n dt h a t()  0,t h a ti s ,t h ed e g r e eo f
service diﬀerentiation decreases with the level of access to the incumbent’s infrastructure.
8This is in line with Guthrie (2006), who argues that between the two extreme cases —pure service-based competi-
tion and pure facility-based competition—there is a continuum of cases in which the entrant relies on the incumbent’s
infrastructure.
4This is a key assumption in our model: once the level of access is set, the degree of diﬀerentiation
is determined exogenously. In reality, ﬁrms can invest in service diﬀerentiation for any given level
of access. However, at least in some cases such investments are limited by the access structure.
For example, entrant ﬁrms can provide television services over DSL if they have an ULL access
(relatively low ), whereas they might not be able to do so if they have a bitstream access (relatively
high ). Also, entrant ﬁrms cannot provide some services—such as VoIP—if they have a pure DSL
resale arrangement with the incumbent ( =1 ).
Cost of entry If the incumbent provides access to its infrastructure at a level , it sets an access
tariﬀ,  = 2 + ,w h e r e ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0 denote the per-unit access price and the ﬁxed access
fee, respectively. The access tariﬀ may take three forms: a ﬁxed fee ( =0  0), a linear tariﬀ
(0=0 ), or a two-part tariﬀ (0 0).
If the entrant obtains access from the incumbent, it pays  a n di n v e s t si nt h er e m a i n i n gn e t w o r k
elements, which entails a cost denoted by (). W ea s s u m et h a t  0,t h a ti s ,t h eh i g h e r
the level of access, the lower the investment required to provide broadband services.9
In the broadband market, this assumption translates to the following. The level of investment
the entrant needs to undertake to enter the broadband market is the highest when it builds its own
infrastructure ( =0 ) , and it is the lowest when it solely relies on the incumbent’s infrastructure
to provide its services, e.g., with a pure resale arrangement ( =1 ) . Entry with bitstream access,
which implies 1 in our setting, involves a higher entry cost (as it requires an investment in
an IP network) than entry with a pure resale arrangement, whereas entry with an access to the
unbundled local loop is more costly than entry with bitstream access (as it requires the entrant to
install its own DSLAMs on top of an IP network).
If the entrant decides to build its own infrastructure, it invests (0). N o t i c et h a tw ed on o t
assume any economies or diseconomies of scope in investing in network elements;10 t h ec o s to f
building the initial  network elements, ((0) − ()), plus the cost of building the remaining
network elements, (), is equal to the cost of building the entire infrastructure, (0).
We also assume proﬁt and welfare functions are concave in .
Below, we list the remaining assumptions of our benchmark model, each of which are relaxed
9This is consistent with the "Ladder of Investment" approach introduced by Martin Cave. See for example, Cave
(2006).
10Our informal exchange with an incumbent operator conﬁrms that there are no signiﬁcant economies of scope in
investing in broadband network elements.
5in Section 5:
i. full-bypass of the incumbent’s network is economically feasible,
ii. for any given level of access, the incumbent and the entrant ﬁrms have a symmetric marginal
cost of providing broadband services, ,a n d
iii. ﬁrms compete with prices.
In Section 5 we also study the case with multiple entrants in a regulated environment.
The timing The timing of the game is as follows. The incumbent decides on the access scheme
{}, that is, it sets the access level, , and the access tariﬀ, .11 Then, the entrant decides
whether or not to obtain access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. If the entrant obtains access,
it invests in the remaining network elements, (1 − ), necessary for providing broadband services.
If it does not obtain any access, it invests (0) and builds its own infrastructure. Finally, ﬁrms
compete, and proﬁts are realized.
3 Equilibrium
We look for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, and hence, start with the last stage of
the game and proceed backwards.
Competition (Stage 3) Let Π denote the proﬁto fﬁrm ,w i t h =1 2, when the entrant
obtains access with the scheme {}. In equilibrium, the incumbent and the entrant obtain
Π1 ()=1 (())+ and Π2 ()=2 (())−, respectively, where the expressions
for 1 and 2 can be found in Appendix A.
Let Π denote the proﬁto fﬁrm , when there is full-bypass. Then, ﬁrms obtain Π1 =  () and
Π2 = () − (0),w i t h
()=
( − )
2 
(2 − )(1+)
2.
Full-bypass is viable if and only if Π2 ≥ 0, which we assume is the case in the benchmark model.
11Note that, at this initial stage, the incumbent decides whether or not to provide any access, since it can decide
to set  =0 , i.e., refuse to deal with the entrant.
6Entrant’s decision to obtain access (Stage 2) The entrant obtains access if and only if
Π2 () ≥ Π2, which can be rewritten as  ≤ Φ(),w i t h
Φ()=2 (()) − () − (() − (0)).
Equilibrium access scheme {} (Stage 1) We ﬁrst determine the optimal access tariﬀ
 for a given , and then, determine the optimal  for the incumbent.
For a given , the problem of the incumbent is:
max

Π1 ()=m a x

{1 (())+}
subject to
 ≤ Φ() (C1)
and
 ≥ 0.( C 2 )
The ﬁrst constraint puts an upper bound to the per-unit access price, whereas the second excludes
subsidized entry. We ﬁnd that 2 (()) is strictly decreasing with , and that there exists a
unique () such that Φ()=0 ,a n ds u c ht h a tf o ra l l() we have Φ()  0.T h a t i s , i f
(), the constraints (C1) and (C2) cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously. We ﬁnd that
()=
( − )(3− ())
2(2− ())
−
(3 − ())(1 + ())
p
()+( () − (0))
2
p
()(2− ())
.
The ﬁrst term represents the threshold unit access charge above which 2  0, which implies that
for all (),w eh a v e2  0 as the second term is positive.
Let b () denote the unconstrained per-unit access price, that is, the per-unit access price that
maximizes Π1 () when (C1) is binding. We ﬁnd that
b ()=
( − )(1− ())(3 − ())
2
2
³
9 − 10()+5( ())
2
´ .
Note that b  can be either higher or lower than ; therefore, the incumbent may not be able to
charge b  in equilibrium. If b , then the incumbent sets  as the per-unit access price and  =0 .
Finally, let  denote for value of full-bypass to the entrant, i.e.,  =  ()−(0). The following
7Proposition characterizes the equilibrium access tariﬀ.
Proposition 1 For a given level of access  ∈ [01],i f()=1 ,t h e n∗ = ∗,w i t h∗ = Φ(0),
and if ()  1,t h e n
(i) ∗ = ∗2 + ∗,w i t h∗ = b ,a n d∗ = Φ(b ),i f is suﬃciently low, and
(ii) ∗ = ∗2,w i t h∗ = ,o t h e r w i s e .
Proof. See Appendix B.
For a given level of access, if the demand for the services of the incumbent and the entrant are
independent (i.e., ()=1 ), the equilibrium access tariﬀ is characterized with a ﬁxed fee. That
is, the incumbent sets a zero per-unit price to maximize the entrant’s gross proﬁt, and extracts it
with the appropriate ﬁxed fee.12
If the demand for services of the two ﬁrms are not independent (i.e., ()  1), depending on
the value of the full-bypass,  , the equilibrium access tariﬀ can be either a linear, or a two-part
tariﬀ. When the value of full-bypass is suﬃciently high, we have b (), which means that the
incumbent cannot set b  and simultaneously satisfy constraints (C1) and (C2). The equilibrium
access tariﬀ is, hence, linear. Otherwise, the equilibrium tariﬀ has two-parts. Since the equilibrium
access tariﬀ can take one of the two forms, below we discuss the properties of each of them separately.
Two-part access tariﬀ in equilibrium
If the value of full bypass,  ,i ss u ﬃciently low, then the equilibrium tariﬀ is characterized with
a two-part tariﬀ; ∗ = ∗2 + ∗,w i t h∗ = b . A per-unit access price increases the perceived
marginal cost of the entrant and therefore enables the incumbent to compete less aggressively.
Lemma 1 When the equilibrium is characterized with a two-part tariﬀ, the per-unit access price
is increasing with the level of access.
Proof. We have b   0, and hence, b   0 for all .
If the value of full-bypass is suﬃciently low, the per-unit access price is higher for a higher
level of access. Note that this result neither relates to the investment cost of the entrant, (),
12Note that, this is unlikely to be the case in the broadband market, where the services provided by diﬀerent ﬁrms
are viewed as substitutes at least to some extent. Therefore, we will not consider this special case is the remaining
of this paper.
8as it is internalized through the ﬁxed fee, nor does it relate to the marginal cost of access, which
is normalized to zero. The access price is increasing with  for purely strategic reasons, and not
for cost reasons: the per-unit price serves as a means to soften competition, and the intensity
of competition depends on the level of access since it determines the degree of diﬀerentiation.
If the level of access is high (low), diﬀerentiation in services is low (high), and the incumbent’s
opportunity cost of expanding its retail sales is high (low) as the competing services are viewed as
strong substitutes by the consumers.
Linear access tariﬀ in equilibrium
If the value of full bypass,  ,i ss u ﬃciently high, the incumbent sets a linear access price, ∗ = ∗2,
with ∗ = .
Lemma 2 When the equilibrium is characterized with a linear tariﬀ, the per-unit access price can
increase or decrease with the level of access.
Proof. We have


=
"
 − 
2(2− )
2 +
(1 − )
¡
2 − 2 +3
¢p
() − (0) + ()
((2 − ))
32
#


+
"
−
(1 + )(3− )
4
p
 () − (0) + ()
p
(2 − )
#


.
The ﬁrst term is negative as the term in brackets is positive and  ≤ 0, whereas the second
term is positive as the term in brackets is negative and  ≤ 0. Therefore, () can either
increase or decrease with .I f is small in absolute terms, then () tends to increase with
.W h e r e a s ,i f is small in absolute terms, then () tends to decrease with .
If the value of full-bypass is suﬃciently high, then the equilibrium tariﬀ does not have a ﬁxed
component, which means that the incumbent cannot fully internalize the impact of the level of
access on the development cost. The level of access aﬀects the linear access price in the following
way: a marginal increase in the level of access implies a lower development cost for the entrant,
which in turn lowers the rents the incumbent needs to give away to ensure that the entrant does
not opt for full-bypass. Since in the absence of a ﬁxed component these rents are purely determined
by the per-unit access price, this implies a higher per-unit access price in equilibrium.
On the other hand, a higher level of access implies a more intense competition due to a lower
degree of diﬀerentiation. For this reason, everything else equal, full-bypass becomes a relatively
9more attractive option to the entrant, which means that the incumbent needs to give up some rents
(to keep the entrant relying on its infrastructure) by charging a lower per-unit access price. Note
that the impact of the level of access on the per-unit access price we have discussed under the
two-part tariﬀ is also present in this case. However, it is dominated by the former eﬀect.
The equilibrium level of access
The optimal level of access is deﬁned by
∗ =a r gm a x
∈[01]
Π1 (∗ ()∗ ()).
Since the value of the outside option determines the structure of the access tariﬀ,w h i c hi nt u r n
aﬀects the equilibrium access level, we discuss the two cases—equilibrium with a two-part tariﬀ and
equilibrium with a linear tariﬀ—separately.
First, consider the case where the value of full-bypass is suﬃciently low so that the equilibrium
access schedule is a two-part tariﬀ and that the equilibrium unit price is characterized by b . Then,
assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst-order condition of the incumbent’s problem can be written
as
 (1 + 2)



−


=0 .( 1 )
The level of access has two opposite eﬀects on the industry proﬁts. The ﬁr s tt e r mi ne q u a t i o n( 1 )
is negative as a higher level of access implies a lower degree of diﬀerentiation, which hurts industry
proﬁts. A higher "market value" (a higher  − ) implies that this ﬁrst term is higher in absolute
terms (as the industry proﬁts are increasing with the market value), and hence, the equilibrium
access level tends to be lower. The second term corresponds to the marginal investment cost, and
it is positive since   0. Therefore, a higher marginal investment cost, , in absolute
terms, leads the incumbent to set a higher level of access. In other words, if the entrant’s investment
cost exhibits a greater sensitivity to the level of access, then the equilibrium level of access tends
to be high, simply because the incumbent has to compensate the entrant for its investment cost by
charging a lower ﬁxed fee.
The following Proposition summarizes these ﬁndings.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium level of access is higher when
(i) the sensitivity of product diﬀerentiation to the level of access (||)i sl o w e r ,a n d
10(ii) the marginal investment cost (||)i sh i g h e r .
Proof. Immediate from equation (1) and our assumption on concavity.
Now, consider the case where the value of the full-bypass is suﬃciently high so that the equi-
librium access schedule is a linear tariﬀ and that the equilibrium unit price is characterized by .
Then, the ﬁrst-order condition can be written as
1



+
1

µ




+




¶
=0 .( 2 )
One can show that 1 has an inverted U-shape with respect to ; it increases with low values
of  and then decreases with higher values of . Therefore, the ﬁrst term can either be negative
or positive. One can also show that the second term can be either negative or positive. This is
because as Lemma 2 shows, the term in parenthesis can either be negative or positive, and this is
also true for 1.
Since it is not possible to characterize the equilibrium level of access in this case, we now revert
to numerical simulations.
A numerical example
We adopt the following functional form for the diﬀerentiation function ()=+(1− ),w h i c h
satisﬁes our assumption ()  0. We assume that ()=
¡
1 − 12¢
, which implies that
the development cost decreases with the level of access. We set  =2and  =0 .
We run our simulations for {} ∈ {010206}×{  +0 1+0 209} and  ∈
{0001 Π(1)}. Note that, within this parameter range, full-bypass can be a viable option or
not.13 Also, the equilibrium tariﬀ structure is linear for 80 per cent of the cases, when full-bypass is
viable. Our simulations show that the ﬁndings of Proposition 2 hold when the equilibrium tariﬀ is
linear. That is, the equilibrium access level is higher when the sensitivity of product diﬀerentiation
to the level of access is lower, and when the marginal investment cost is higher.14
13In 62 per cent of the cases, full-bypass is viable.
14We have || = − and || increasing with . In order to verify part (i) of Proposition 2, we ﬁx ,a n d
test if a marginal increase in  (by a step of 001) leads to an increase in 
∗. To verify part (ii), we test whether a
marginal increase in  (by a step of 001) leads to an increase in 
∗.
114 Socially optimal level of access
In this section, we assume that both the access price and the access level is subject to regulation,
and we characterize the socially optimal access schedule.
The social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of industry proﬁts and consumer surplus. Let  = +
1+2,w h e r e denotes the consumer surplus, which is given by  =( ( 1)
2+(2)
2+2(1− ))2.
The social welfare is then given by  =  − ().
Let  and  = 2 +  denote the socially optimal access level and tariﬀ, respectively.
Note that the ﬁxed fee, , has a neutral eﬀect on social welfare, as it is a pure transfer from the
entrant to the incumbent.
Lemma 3 For a given , the optimal access tariﬀ is characterized by a zero per-unit access price.
Proof. We have
2
2 =
−
¡
52 − 10 +9
¢
(3 − )
2 (1 + )
2  0
for all ,a n d


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=0
=
−(3 − )
2 ( − )
(52 − 10 +9 )
 0,
therefore,  is decreasing with  which implies that the optimal per-unit price is  =0 .
Given that  =0 , the regulator chooses  so as to maximize (()0)−(). In comparing
the socially optimal level of access with the equilibrium level of access in the unregulated environ-
ment, we focus our attention to the range of parameters for which the equilibrium tariﬀ schedule
is two-part, i.e., ∗ = b ()2 + Φ(b ). To study the case when the equilibrium tariﬀ is linear, i.e.,
∗ = ()2, we revert to numerical simulations as it is not possible to provide analytical results.
The problem of the incumbent is to choose  so as to maximize 1 (()∗ (()))+2 (()∗ (()))−
(). Given our assumption on concavity of  and Π1, the incumbent sets too low an  if
 (1 (()∗ (())) + 2 (()∗ (())))





and too high an  otherwise. This condition is equivalent to
 (1 (∗ ()) + 2 (∗ ()))





given that   0.
12Proposition 3 The equilibrium level of access is suboptimally low if (∗) is suﬃciently high, and
suboptimally high otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix C.
We ﬁnd that ∗   if (∗)  0306 and ∗ ≥  otherwise.15 If (∗) is suﬃciently high,
then by oﬀering a lower level of access, an unregulated incumbent limits the adverse eﬀect of a
lower degree of diﬀerentiation on its proﬁt. Otherwise, it prefers to set a higher level of access that
enables it to extract a higher rent from the entrant.
For the cases in which the equilibrium tariﬀ is linear, we cannot provide analytical results.
However, using the speciﬁcations provided in Section 3, we ran simulations and veriﬁed that the
equilibrium level of access is suboptimally low for high values of (∗), and is suboptimally high
otherwise.16
5E x t e n s i o n s
In this section we discuss how our main results are modiﬁed when we relax some of the assumptions
we have made in the benchmark model.
5.1 No full-bypass option for the entrant
The major policy justiﬁcation for access regulation is that competition may not viable without the
entrants’ access to the incumbent’s infrastructure in reasonable terms, and that an unregulated
incumbent may not have incentives to open its infrastructure to its competitors in the absence
of regulation. The implicit assumption is that pure facility-based competition (i.e., full-bypass)
is economically not feasible, or is very limited. In this paper, we assumed that full-bypass was
indeed an option—yet an expensive one—for the entrant (i.e., Π2 ≥ 0), and studied the incumbent’s
incentives when it sets the access scheme and showed that the equilibrium per-unit access charge
is either b  or  in this case.
Let  denote the threshold per-unit access charge, above which 2 (())−() is negative.
Since  represents the same threshold for 2 (())−()− , and since 2 (())  0,we
have  ≥ . Similarly to our benchmark analysis, one can show that when full-bypass is not feasible,
15This implies that if  ≥ 0306,t h e n
∗ 
 always.
16For the entire range of parameter values (which includes both linear and two-part tariﬀ structures) the average
(
∗) when the equilibrium level of access is suboptimally high is 013, whereas when the equilibrium level of access
is suboptimally low, it is 063.
13the equilibrium per-unit access charge is either b  or .S i n c e ≥ , whenever the per-unit access
charge is determined by b  (with the outside option), the same access price would apply in the
absence of the outside option. Moreover, in such cases, the access level set by the incumbent (given
that it does not deny access) would be the same as in our benchmark model. This is simply because
the entrant’s opportunity cost of obtaining access from the incumbent (i.e.,  ) does not depend
on the level of access when b  ≤ , and hence, the optimal access level is the same regardless of the
presence of an outside option. (See Appendix D.)
However, in other cases (i.e., if b  ≤  or b ), this is no longer true. For a given level
of access, the incumbent sets a higher per-unit price when the entrant has no outside option than
when it has one, as  ≥  implies min
©
b 
ª
 . Therefore, the equilibrium level of access might
be diﬀerent with the full-bypass option and with no full-bypass option.
Finally, we ran our simulations with the same functional forms and parameter values speciﬁed
in Section 3 to test whether there is foreclosure in equilibrium when full-bypass is not viable. Our
simulations conﬁrm that there is no foreclosure in equilibrium. This is because, with a two-part
tariﬀ schedule the incumbent—at the worse—can replicate the monopoly proﬁts. Our simulations
show that this is also true when the equilibrium tariﬀ is linear.17
5.2 Asymmetric marginal costs
In this section, we assume that the incumbent’s downstream marginal cost for providing broadband
services is equal to  and that the entrant’s marginal cost is equal to  + ,w h e r e can be either
positive or negative.
If the equilibrium tariﬀ schedule is two-part, one can show that the per-unit access price is
decreasing with . That is, the incumbent provides access at a lower unit-price to a relatively less
eﬃcient entrant.
If the incumbent provides access to a level  of its infrastructure and charges b ,t h em a r g i n a l
eﬀect of  on Π1 () i sg i v e nb ye q u a t i o n( 1 ) .S i n c e is negative and (1+2) is positive,
then the higher (1+2),t h eg r e a t e r∗ is. We ﬁnd that 2(1+2) ≤ 0, which implies
that the industry proﬁts become less sensitive to product diﬀerentiation when the entrant’s cost
ineﬃciency () increases for a given . The reason is that any eﬃciency diﬀerence between the
incumbent and the entrant mitigates the eﬀect of product diﬀerentiation which is determined by
17Note that, we do not restrict the tariﬀ schedule to be linear or ﬁxed, in which cases one could observe foreclosure.
14the incumbent’s access strategy. Hence, the incumbent provides access at a higher level when the
entrant is less eﬃcient.
Proposition 4 The larger the entrant’s cost ineﬃciency (relative to the incumbent), ,t h eh i g h e r
the level of access, ∗.
Proof. See Appendix E.
For the cases where the equilibrium tariﬀ is linear, using the same functional speciﬁcations and
parameter values, we ran simulations and veriﬁed that a marginal increase in the entrant’s marginal
cost leads to a higher equilibrium level of access.18
5.3 Cournot competition
In this section, we compare our results of the benchmark model to those that would be obtained
under Cournot competition. When the equilibrium is characterized with a two-part tariﬀ,w eﬁnd
that the per-unit access price under Cournot competition is
b  =
( − )(1− )(1+)
2
2(1+6 − 32)
.
For a given , the per-unit price is lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand compe-
tition. The intuition follows that of Arya et al. (2008); under Bertrand competition, the per-unit
price serves as a commitment to compete softly, but this commitment does not work under Cournot
competition.
Let 
 and 
 denote the equilibrium proﬁto fﬁrm  under Bertrand competition and Cournot
competition, respectively. Assume that Π1 is concave in . If the equilibrium under both Bertrand
and Cournot competition is characterized by a two-part tariﬀ, then the equilibrium access level is
higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition if

¡

1 + 
2
¢



¡

1 (∗ ()) + 
2 (∗ ())
¢


The following proposition shows that this is true only for low degrees of diﬀerentiation.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium level of access is higher under Cournot competition than under
Bertrand competition if (∗)  0175 and is lower otherwise.
18From our benchmark case with symmetric marginal costs, we tested if a marginal increase in the entrant’s
marginal cost (with a step of 10
−3)l e a d st oah i g h e r
∗.
15Proof. We ﬁnd that

¡

1 + 
2
¢

−

¡

1 + 
2
¢

has the sign of 155−674+1103−542−45+9. This polynomial is decreasing in  for  ∈ [01],
is negative for 0175 and is positive otherwise. Therefore, the equilibrium level of access is
higher under Cournot for 0175 and is lower otherwise.
The per-unit access price serves as a better commitment device to soften competition under
Bertrand than under Cournot competition. Nevertheless, the proﬁts under Cournot competition
are less sensitive to diﬀerentiation than they are under Bertrand competition.
5.4 Cost-based access regulation and free entry (or multiple entrants)
In the broadband telecommunications market, the conventional wisdom is that a higher level of
access (e.g., pure resale) would result in a higher number of entrant ﬁrms. In this section, we extend
our analysis to multiple entrants, and while doing so, we assume that the access to the incumbent’s
infrastructure is subject to cost-based regulation ( =0 ). We compute the free entry equilibrium,
and compare how the number of entrant ﬁrms change with the access level set by the incumbent.
We consider  ≥ 1 symmetric entrants,19 which means that together with the incumbent  +1
ﬁrms compete in the market, each of which earn a gross proﬁto f
()=
( − )
2 [ − ( − 1)]
[ − ( − 2)]
2 ( +1− )
.
Given that access is provided at level , each entrant makes a net proﬁto f (())−().W e
have
()

= −(1 − )( − )
2 
(1 − )(2 (1 − )+1+3 ) +2 2
[ − ( − 2)]
3 ( +1− )
2  0,
and hence, the net proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm decreases as the number of entrants increases. Therefore,
in the free entry equilibrium, the number of entrants, ∗, is the maximum integer  such that
(()) ≥ (). Ignoring the integer problem, we deﬁne the equilibrium number of entrants by
(∗()) = ().
19In this section, we only consider symmetric entrants. With asymmetric entrants diﬀerent strategic concerns may
arise. For example, an unregulated incumbent could adopt an exclusive access strategy and provide a higher level of
access than it would provide under non-exclusivity, and deter entry if the infrastructure development cost of the next
potential entrant in line is suﬃciently high.
16We now determine the relation between ∗ and .A h i g h e r  has two opposite eﬀects on the
equilibrium number of entrants. First, a higher  implies a lower (), which leads to a higher ∗
(due to the cost eﬀect). At the same time, a higher  implies a lower (), which leads to a lower
(()), and hence to a lower ∗ (due to the competition eﬀect). Indeed, we have
()

=
( − )
2 
( +1− )
2 ( − ( − 2))
3
h
(1 + )(1− )
2 2 +( 1− )
¡
32 +1
¢
 +2 3
i
 0.
If the competition eﬀect dominates the cost eﬀect, then the equilibrium number of entrants is
decreasing with the level of access. Otherwise, it is increasing with the level of access.
As an illustration, consider the same functional speciﬁcations as in Section 4, except a slight
modiﬁcation in the investment cost function; ()=
¡
1 − 12¢
+0,w i t ha n d0 =0 004.20 The
ﬁgure below shows the equilibrium number of entrants (deﬁned as the maximum integer  such
that  (()) ≥ ()) as a function of the level of access for  =0 1,  =0 9 and  =0 4.A s
the ﬁgure shows, the number of entrants varies non-monotonically with the level of access. Starting
from no access ( =0 ), the number of entrants decreases as the level of access increases until a
certain level of access ( =0 4) after which the number of entrants increases with the level of access.
Note that, in this particular example, there are more competitors in the market when there is pure
facility-based competition ( ≈ 0) than when there is pure service-based competition ( ≈ 1).
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This example shows that in our framework the number of entrants does not necessarily increase
with the level of access, which contradicts the conventional wisdom. This is because, though the
eﬀect of the level of access on the entry cost is usually well identiﬁed (this is the cost eﬀect), the
20We assume that there is a small ﬁxed cost of entry in addition regardless of the level of access to avoid an inﬁnite
number of entrants for  =1 .
17eﬀe c to ft h el e v e lo fa c c e s so nd i ﬀerentiation (i.e., the competition eﬀect) is generally not taken
into account. When both eﬀects are accounted for, there is a non- monotonic relation between the
level of access and the equilibrium number of entrants.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have shown that to the extent that infrastructure sharing aﬀects the degree of service diﬀer-
entiation, the incumbent can shape post-entry competition via setting the level of access. Our
benchmark model predicts that the equilibrium level of access is suboptimally high if the degree of
diﬀerentiation is high and it is suboptimally low otherwise.
Factors that alter the sensitivity of the industry proﬁts to the degree of service diﬀerentiation
(e.g., the type of competition, cost asymmetries in production) also aﬀect the equilibrium level of
access, and therefore the degree of infrastructure sharing. In particular, Cournot competition yields
a lower equilibrium level of access unless the degree of diﬀerentiation is very low. Furthermore,
when the incumbent faces a relatively ineﬃcient ﬁrm, it sets a higher level of access. Extending our
model to allow for free entry (under regulated access), we also show that the equilibrium number
of competitors can vary non-monotonically with the level of access.
Although our model provides a framework to study infrastructure sharing by ﬁxed-line incum-
bent operators, one needs to introduce competing infrastructure owners to study, for example,
mobile network operators’ incentives to share their infrastructures with virtual mobile network
operators. Our theoretical framework can be extended to address these and similar questions. Fi-
nally, we assumed that the incumbent has perfect information on both the marginal production
and investment costs of the entrant. When this is not true, the incumbent may provide multiple
access schemes with multiple levels of access, which could serve as a screening device.
References
[1] Armstrong, M. (2002). The theory of access pricing and interconnection. In M. E. Cave, S.
K. Majumdar, & I. Vogelsang (Eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics: Vol. 1,
structure, regulation and competition, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 295—384.
[2] Arya, A., Mittendorf , B., and Sappington , D. (2008). Outsourcing, vertical integration, and
price vs. quantity competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization. Vol. 26, pp.
181-16.
[3] Avenali, A., Matteucci, G., & Reverberi, P. (2009), Dynamic access pricing and incentives
to invest in alternative infrastructures.International Journal of Industrial Organization.V o l .
28(2), pp. 176-190.
[4] Bourreau, M. and Dogan, P. (2006). ‘Build-or-Buy’ strategies in the local loop. American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 96(2), pp. 72—76.
[5] Bourreau, M. and Dogan, P. (2005). Unbundling the local loop. European Economic Review,
Vol. 49, pp.173-199.
[6] Bourreau, M., Hombert, J., Pouyet, J. and Schutz, N. (2009). Upstream Competition Between
Vertically Integrated Firms. Mimeo.
[7] Cambini, C. and Jiang, Y. (2009). Broadband investment and regulation: A literature review.
Telecommunications Policy. Vol. 33(10-11), pp. 559-574.
[8] Cave, M., (2006). Encouraging infrastructure competition via the ladder of investment.
Telecommunications Policy, Vol 30, pp. 223-237.
[9] Crandall, R., Ingraham, A., and Singer, H. (2004). Do unbundling policies discourage CLEC
facilities-based investment. The B.E. Journals in Economic Analysis & Policy,M a n u s c r i p t
1136.
[10] Dixit, A., 1979. A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers. Bell Journal of
Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 20-32.
[11] Friederiszick, H., Grajek, M., and Roller, L.-H. (2008). Analyzing the Relationship between
Regulation and Investment in the Telecom Sector. ESMI White Paper No. WP-108-01.
[12] Gayle, P. G. and Weisman, D. L. (2007). Are input prices irrelevant for make-or-buy decisions?
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 32, pp.195—207.
[13] Jorde, T., Sidak, G., and Teece, D. (2000). Innovation, investment and unbundling. Yale
Journal on Regulation, Vol. 17(1), pp. 1-37.
[14] Laﬀont, J.-J., Tirole, J. (2000). Competition in telecommunications, Munich Lectures in Eco-
nomics. MIT Press, New York.
19[15] Sappington, D. (2005). On the irrelevance of input prices for make-of-buy decisions. American
Economic Review, Vol. 95(5), 1631—1638.
[16] Singh, N., Vives, X. (1984). Price and Quantity Competition in a Diﬀerentiated Duopoly.
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 546-554.
[17] Vareda, J. (2007). Unbundling and incumbent investment in quality upgrades and cost reduc-
tion. Portuguese Competition Authority. Working Paper No. 526.
[18] Vogelsang, I. (2003). Price regulation of access to telecommunications networks. Journal of
Economics Literature, Vol. 41(3), pp. 830-862.
[19] Wallsten, S. and Hausladen, S. (2009). Net neutrality, unbundling and their eﬀects on interna-
tional investment in next generation networks. Review of Network Economics, Vol. 8(1), pp.
90-112.
[20] Waverman, L., Meschi, M., Reillier, B., and Dasgupta, K. (2007). Access regulation and
infrastructure investment in the telecommunications sector: an empirical investigation. Report
by LECG Consulting, London, UK.
20Appendix
A Stage 3 equilibrium proﬁts
At stage 3 the incumbent and the entrant set prices simultaneously to maximize their proﬁts,
Π1 =( 1 − )1 + 2 + ,a n dΠ2 =( 2 −  − )2 − , respectively. Let
1 =( 1 − )1 + 2
and
2 =( 2 −  − )2.
In equilibrium, we ﬁnd that
1 ()=
[( − )(3− ) +3 (1 − )][( − )(3− ) − (1 − )(2− )]
(1 + )
2 (3 − )
2 (2 − )
+
(3 − )( − ) − 2(2 − )
(1 + )(3− )(2− )
,
and
2 ()=
[( − )(3− ) − 2(2 − ))]
2
(1 + )
2 (3 − )
2 (2 − )
.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The incumbent’s problem is
max

Π1 ()=m a x

{1 (())+},
subject to (C1) and (C2). The nondegenerate constraint qualiﬁcation holds at any candidate
solution, as the Jacobian matrix of the constraint functions has rank two. We form the Lagrangian
(1 2)=1 (())+ − 1 ( − 2 (())+()+( () − (0))) + 2.
The two ﬁrst order conditions are


=


(1 (())+12 (())) = 0,


=1− 1 + 2 =0 ,
21and we have
(a) 1 ( − 2 (())+()+( () − (0))) = 0, 2 =0 ,
(b) 1 ≥ 0, 2 ≥ 0,
(c)  − 2 (()) ≤− () − ( () − (0)) and  ≥ 0.
We have 2 =0either because (i)  =0 ,o r( i i )2 =0 .
(i) If 2 =0 ,t h e n1 =1(from the second FOC). Since 1 =1 ,t h e n maximizes 1 + 2 from
the ﬁrst FOC, and we have necessarily  = 2 (())+()+( () − (0)).
(ii) If  =0 ,t h e n = 2 (())+()+(  () − (0)) = 0,a s1 − 1 + 2 =0and 2 ≥ 0
imply that 1  0.T h e r e f o r e ,w eh a v e = () and  =0 .
C Proof of Proposition 3
We have (for  =0 )
 =(  − )
2 2 +1
(1 + )
2 (2 − )
.
We ﬁnd that
 (1 (∗ ()) + 2 (∗ ()))

=2(  − )
2
¡
54 − 192 +3 6 2 − 36 +1 8
¢
(2 − )
2 (52 − 10 +9 )
2 
and


=(  − )
2 42 −  +1
(1 + )
3 (2 − )
2
We ﬁnd that
 (1 + 2)





holds if and only if 0306.
D No full-bypass option for the entrant
If Π2  0, the only possibility of entry is through access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. If the
incumbent decides to share its infrastructure, it ﬁrst sets  and  such that its proﬁts are maximized
22for a given , subject to 0 ≤  ≤ (()) − (). The inequality on the right-hand side is similar
t o( C 1 )e x c e p tt h a tt h ev a l u eo ft h eo u t s i d eo p t i o n( i . e . , ) is zero here. Therefore, the analysis
is similar to the benchmark analysis. In particular, if ∗ = b  with the outside option, then ∗ = b 
also without the outside option. This is because the upper bound on  without the outside option,
, is such that () ≥ () for all . Given that the optimal per-unit price is the same with or
without the outside option, and given that the incumbent provides access to the entrant, then, the
optimal level of access is also the same.
However, since the entrant has no outside option, the incumbent could deter entry by setting
 =0(no access). The incumbent decides whether or not to provide access by comparing its
monopoly proﬁt if it refuses to provide access, 
1 =(  − )
2 4, to its equilibrium proﬁti fi t
provides access, Π1 (∗).
E Proof of Proposition 4
Let
 ()=


(1 + 2)

.
We ﬁnd that


 ()=−
4(1− )
¡
54 − 203 +4 0 2 − 40 +1 8
¢
2 (2 − )
2 (52 − 10 +9 )
2
is negative for all  ∈ [01]. Therefore,  () is decreasing in .S i n c e
 (0)=
−2( − 1)
¡
54 − 203 +4 1 2 − 44 +2 2
¢
(2 − )
2 (52 − 10 +9 )
2
is negative for all  ∈ [01],w eh a v ep r o v e dt h a t(1 + 2) is decreasing with , which proves
that ∗ is increasing with .¥
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